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1. Introduction  
Sourcing or procurement is the process by which a company obtains goods and services for 
its manufacturing and operations. The materials procured could range from raw materials, 
components, and sub-assemblies, to office supplies and furniture. The services procured can 
be as vital as design and R&D to daily operations like IT and logistics. e-Sourcing or e-
procurement refers to online procurement of the above direct and indirect inputs by an 
industrial buyer. The other predominantly used terms for this process are procurement 
auctions, reverse auctions, and e-auctions. We use the above terms in this chapter with the 
following definition of Minahan (2001): the process of utilising Web-based technologies to support 
the identification, evaluation, negotiation, and configuration of optimal groupings of trading partners 
into a supply chain network, which can then respond to changing market demands with greater 
efficiency. 
e-Sourcing of production and non-production goods and services has been in practice since 
early 1990s, especially among the Fortune 2000 companies. It was widely accepted then that 
web based sourcing can provide following advantages (Minahan 2001): 
- Identify and negotiate with a broad range of qualified suppliers; 
- Reduce process costs for sourcing engagements; 
- Shorten sourcing cycles by 25% to 30%; 
- Reduce time-to-market cycles by 10% to 15%; 
- Negotiate an average of 5% to 20% unit price reductions; 
- Extend strategic sourcing to a wider range of products and services; and 
- Enhance collaboration and knowledge sharing. 
The market analysts’ predictions about the worth of online business transactions were in 
trillions of USD by 2003/4. However, the e-bust that happened in 2000, followed by the 
market studies of the real world implementations showed that these figures are indeed 
exaggerated and overstated, if not false (Emiliani & Stec, 2004; 2005). Irrespective of the 
figures projected and achieved, the use of e-sourcing is growing with steady incremental 
gains rather than abrupt exponential profits.  
- Ariba1, a leading provider of online spend management solutions, has enabled sourcing 
of USD 250 Billion worth of goods and services till date, using its Ariba Sourcing 
Solution. The total annual savings generated is over USD 15 Billion (Ariba, 2007).  
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- GlaxoSmithKline achieved a 5,452% annualized return-on-investment using Emptoris2 
(another leader in providing sourcing solutions and a pioneer in the use of optimization 
for strategic sourcing in industry).  
- Motorola received the prestigious Franz Edelman Award for Achievement in 
Operations Research and the Management Sciences in 2004 for the application of 
optimization bid analysis with Emptoris to save USD 600 million.  
- More than 60 Fortune 500 companies use CombineNet3 for their most advanced 
strategic sourcing activities, with greater than 45x average return on investment. 
- Volume-discount and combinatorial auctions benefited Mars Inc. and its suppliers 
(Hohner et al., 2003). 
- Chilean government used combinatorial auctions to assign catering contracts for the 
supply of school meals to children and resulted in a 22% cost savings (Epstein et al., 
2002). 
In this chapter, we present different optimization based e-sourcing auctions from the 
literature and industry best practices. We also extend how these mechanisms could be used 
in global sourcing and the future research to include risk mitigation. 
Auction is a market mechanism with well-defined set of rules for determining the terms of 
an exchange of something for money (McAfee & McMillan, 1987). Procurement auctions are 
reverse auctions in the sense that the buyer is the auctioneer and the sellers (suppliers) are 
the bidders. Traditionally, auctions for procurement at the industrial scale were mainly used 
by government for purchasing goods and services. The main reasons are openness and 
fairness of auctions, and till today, government purchasing happens through auctions. 
However, for many years, auctions played a relatively minor role in industrial procurement 
(Rothkopf & Whinston, 2007).  
The industrial approach to procurement was to develop long-term cooperative relationships 
with few suppliers. The advent of Internet and the advancement of e-commerce changed 
this approach radically. The long term strategic partnerships with suppliers are still 
prevalent for sourcing of custom designed goods and services. On the other hand, for 
sourcing of commoditized goods and services, e-sourcing through auctions are being 
increasingly used by industries (Kouvelis et al., 2006). Also among the academics, there is a 
recent growing interest in this Internet based business process that led to new generation of 
procurement techniques like combinatorial (Cramton et al., 2006), volume discount (Eso et al., 
2005) and multi-attribute (Bichler et al., 1999; Kameshwaran et al., 2007). 
e-Sourcing and in general, e-auctions, are being studied by scholars from different 
disciplines such as economics, operations research, management science, information 
systems, and computer science (Rothkopf & Whinston 2007). Many works from operations 
research and management science community approach e-sourcing from the perspective of 
solving a supply chain optimization problem. This chapter also adopts the same perspective 
and other economic issues like information asymmetry, adverse selection, and moral hazards 
(McAfee & McMillan, 1987) are not addressed here.  
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the dynamics of the sourcing 
process, briefly outlines the design issues, and introduces the three different sourcing 
formats considered in this chapter. The three sourcing techniques are presented in detail in 
                                                 
2 http://www.emptoris.com 
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sections 3 to 5. For each of the techniques, the mathematical programming formulation is 
presented. Sourcing based on volume discounts, one of earliest formats in business 
tradition, is presented in Section 3. The more recent and popular combinatorial sourcing is 
described in Section 4. Multi-attribute sourcing and its extension configurable bids are 
discussed in Section 5. Section 6 is devoted to global sourcing, where the traditional 
industrial procurement format of a single buyer with multiple suppliers is extended to 
multiple factories of the same organization procuring from multiple suppliers. Section 7 
discusses the robustness approach to e-sourcing to design a risk-tolerant sourcing network 
that will operate at acceptable levels under a wide range of pre-identified random scenarios. 
Final notes are given in Section 8 and references are listed in Section 9. 
2. Dynamics, design issues, and taxonomy 
2.1 Dynamics 
The overall industrial sourcing dynamics can be described as a standard three-step process: 
(1) Pre-auction stage, (2) auction stage, and (3) post-auction stage. This is adapted from the 
three-step process described in Caplice & Sheffi (2007) for procurement of transportation 
services.  
Pre-auction stage 
The buyer forecasts the demand for the planning horizon and determines which suppliers to 
invite for the sourcing auction. Common practice is to retain most incumbents (to maintain 
long term buyer-supplier relationship) and invite some new suppliers. A set of mandatory 
supplier selection criteria (Weber et al. 1991) is used to identify these potential suppliers. 
The buyer also decides the format of the auction and bid structure (to be described in detail). 
Auction stage  
The demand, auction format, and the bid structure are communicated to the pre-selected 
suppliers in the form of RFQ or RFP through the use of faxed lists, spreadsheets, online web 
pages, email, or direct EDI connections. The suppliers conduct their own analysis and 
prepare the bid according the required format. The bidding phase in the auction could be 
single round or multiple rounds (see Figure 1).  Once the bids are received, the buyer solves the 
winner determination problem (WDP), where the bids are evaluated to determine the winning 
the suppliers (also known as bid evaluation problem). In the single round auction, the auction 
closes after this stage and the suppliers are intimated of their status. In multi-round 
auctions, the winners determined are provisional winners and the suppliers are given 
feedback information, using which they can resubmit bids. Once a termination criterion is 
met the auction is closed. The criterion could be that no new bids from suppliers or the 
upper bound on the number of rounds reached. 
Post-auction stage 
Once the auction is closed, the results of the WDP are uploaded to the downstream 
planning, execution, auditing, and payment systems. 
2.2 Design issues 
The sourcing process with RFX generation and bidding by suppliers is inherently based on 
auctions and hence the design principles for sourcing generally follow auction design. As 
mentioned above, auctions can be categorized based on the dynamics as: (1) single-round or 
one-shot auctions and (2) multiple-round or progressive or iterative auctions. Single-round 
auctions are sealed bid auctions. Multi-round auctions can be sealed bid or open bid, but has  
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Fig. 1. Single-round and multi-round auction dynamics 
multiple rounds of bidding phases. At the end of each bidding phase, there will be flow of 
information from the auctioneer to the bidders. This will help the bidders to prepare their 
bids for the next bidding phase. The design parameters of single-round auctions are bid 
structure, winner determination policy, and pricing policy. The bid structure specifies the format 
of bids, the winner determination policy describes the technique to determine the winners, 
and the pricing policy determines the price(s) of the winning good(s). 
On the other hand, design of multi-round auctions is relatively non-trivial, which includes 
the specification of bid structure, winner determination technique at each bidding round, 
information exchange at the end of each round, termination condition, and the pricing 
policy. Multi-round auction has many advantages over its one-shot counterpart (Cramton 
1998), especially in sourcing (Parkes & Kalagnanam 2005). There are many design 
methodologies for multi-round auctions for sourcing (Bikhchandani & Ostroy 2006, 
Kameshwaran et al. 2005, Parkes & Kalagnanam 2005). 
The sourcing process with the RFX and the bidding, only borders on auctions and are 
indeed less formally structured than auctions. The auction design is generally based on the 
www.intechopen.com
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principles of mechanism design. Mechanism design (Mas-Colell et al., 1995) is the sub-field of 
microeconomics and game theory that considers how to implement good system-wide 
solutions to problems that involve multiple self interested agents, each with private 
information about their preferences. The mechanism design methodology has also been 
found useful in designing e-markets (Varian, 1995). One of the main assumptions in 
mechanism design is that the rules of the auction are a common knowledge to all the 
participating agents. In sourcing, though the rules of bid submission are common 
knowledge, rules of winner determination may not be revealed to the suppliers. The 
purchasing manager may take into account several business rules and purchasing logic in 
winner determination, which are not generally revealed to the suppliers. Moreover, the 
criteria and the constraints can be modified by the auctioneer (buyer), based on the received 
bids. Here, we do not follow the mechanism design approach.  
Pricing policy is another design issue, which dictates the price to be paid to the winning 
suppliers for the supply of the winning goods. The commonly used pricing policy in current 
e-sourcing systems is the pay-as-bid or first price policy where the suppliers are paid the cost 
quoted in their respective bids. There are non-trivial pricing policies such as VCG (Ausubel 
& Milgrom, 2006), where the price is function of the price quoted by the other suppliers. 
Though this pricing policy has certain desirable economic features, it is not widely used in 
practice.  
 
Fig. 2. Factors considered by Motorola in awarding business to suppliers (Source: Metty et 
al. (2005)) 
2.2 Bid structure and winner determination 
We consider only the design issues related to bid structure and winner determination 
technique, from the perspective of the buying organization (auctioneer). The bid structure 
dictates how a bid is defined. For example, it could be as simple as a unit price for an item or 
set of attributes like unit price, lead time, quantity, etc. A rich bid structure is advantageous 
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to both the buyer and suppliers. The buyer has more negotiating parameters rather than just 
unit price and hence can optimize the total cost or procurement. Suppliers, on the other 
hand, can differentiate themselves from their competitors with value added services rather 
than competing on just cost. The earlier e-sourcing techniques achieved cost reduction to 
buyers by squeezing the profit margins of the competing suppliers. Many historical and 
incumbent suppliers did not prefer the online sourcing as they felt that the buyers used it to 
wring price concessions from them in the presence of new suppliers (Jap, 2002). However, e-
sourcing evolved with a rich set of bid structures, providing a win-win situation to both the 
buyers and sellers, and thereby achieving overall supply chain efficiency. Figure 2 shows the  
factors considered by Motorola to minimize the total cost of ownership while awarding 
business to the suppliers (Metty et al., 2005). 
The winner determination problem faced by the buyer at the end of the bidding phase (or at 
the end of every bidding phase in progressive auctions) is an optimization problem. The 
problem is to determine the set of winning suppliers and their respective winning items, 
such that the total procurement cost is minimized subject to various business constraints 
and purchasing policies. Indeed, one of the earliest applications of linear programming is 
winner determination (also referred as bid evaluation) (Gainen et al., 1954). Many 
commercial bid analysis products from companies like Emptoris, and CombineNet use 
optimization techniques like linear programming, combinatorial optimization, and 
constraint programming. Optimization also allows for addition of business constraints and 
purchasing logic as side constraints in winner determination, which is a new development 
in sourcing auctions (Rothkopf & Whinston, 2007). Some of the commonly used business 
rules are: 
- Limiting the number of winning suppliers in a given range; 
- Limiting the business awarded (in terms of quantity or worth) to a winning supplier in 
a given range; 
- Guaranteeing a minimum amount of business to incumbent suppliers; 
Note that the above business rules need not be disclosed to the suppliers and often many of 
them are experimented with WDP like analyzing what-if scenarios.  
2.3 Taxonomy 
We categorize the e-sourcing techniques based on the bid structure and the winner 
determination policy, which also implicitly depends on the number of goods purchased and 
their respective quantities. We broadly classify e-sourcing under three categories: (a) 
Volume discount sourcing, (b) Combinatorial sourcing, and (c) Multi-attribute and multi-
criteria sourcing. We describe each of the above in detail in the following sections. 
3. Volume discount sourcing 
Volume or quantity discounts in sourcing is a long established business tradition. Buyers 
expect discounts for buying large quantities and the suppliers provide discounts to price 
discriminate from the competing suppliers. Studies by Lippman (1969), Prikul & Aras 
(1985), Jucker & Rosenblatt (1985), and Dolan (1987) focus on how buyers determine the 
economic order quantities with quantity discounts. On the other hand, Crowther (1964), 
Monahan (1984), Lee & Rosenblatt (1986), and Kim & Hwang (1988) focus on the supplier's 
perspective of formulating the form of quantity discount pricing schedule.  
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Fig. 3. Piecewise linear cost function as bid 
According to Sadrian & Yoon (1994), the rationale behind quantity discount models is 
derived from the numerous economic advantages gained from buyers ordering larger 
quantities of products. With larger orders, both the supplier and the buyer should be able to 
reduce their order processing costs. These might include packaging and handling costs, 
administrative costs, and shipping costs. However, the major benefits come from the savings 
in the supplier's manufacturing costs. A supplier that produces the item itself for these 
larger orders will require fewer manufacturing setups and have larger production runs. 
These savings are especially significant if the supplier experiences high product-specific 
setup costs. On the other hand, increased order size results in a higher inventory holding 
cost for the buyer. Therefore, the supplier should compensate for this extra cost with an 
attractive quantity discount pricing schedule to induce buyers to increase their order size. 
Munson and Rosenblatt (1998) provided a classification of different quantity discounts. The 
form of discount could be all-units or incremental. In all-units form, the discount is applicable 
to all the units purchased, whereas in incremental, the discount is applicable only to the 
additional units that has crossed the break-up point. The item aggregation describes whether 
the discount applies to one or multiple products (bundling). A business volume discount 
represents item aggregation where the price breakpoints are based on the total dollar 
volume of business across all products purchased from the supplier. The time aggregation 
describes whether the discounts apply to individual purchases or multiple purchases over a 
given time frame. Finally, the number of price breakpoints may be one, multiple, or infinite 
(as represented by a continuous price schedule). In this section, we present incremental 
discount form applied to sourcing of multiple units of a single item (Kameshwaran & 
Narahari, 2009b). Our focus here is on solving the WDP faced by the buyer, when the 
suppliers submit non-convex piecewise linear quantity discount price functions. 
3.1 Sourcing of multiple units of a single item 
Consider an industrial procurement of multiple units of a single item. The demanded item 
can be a raw material or a sub-component and let the demanded number of units be B. Let N 
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be the number of potential suppliers, out of whom the winning suppliers have to be 
selected. Usually, the buyer prefers multi-sourcing as the supply failure in a single supplier 
scenario will be disruptive. Further, the demand B could be formidably large for a single 
supplier. With multi-sourcing, the buyer needs to determine the winning suppliers and also 
their winning quantity. This provides an additional negotiable parameter to the suppliers in 
addition to unit price. The bid thus is a price function defined over quantity. The price 
function that is commonly used in industry for long-term strategic sourcing is piecewise 
linear (Davenport & Kalagnanam, 2002). 
3.2 Piecewise linear bid 
The bid submitted by supplier j  is a cost function 
j
Q  defined over the supply quantity 
].,[ jj za  jQ  is piecewise linear and nonconvex, as shown in Figure 3. It can be represented 
compactly by tuples of break points, slopes, and costs at break points: 
0 1 0(( ,..., ),( ,..., ), ( ,..., )).j j j
l l l
j j j j j j j j j
Q a z n nδ δ β β≡ = =# # # #  For notational convenience, define 
1~~ −−≡ sjsjsj δδδ  and sjn as the jump cost associated with linear segment s . Note that, by this 
definition, 00 ~ jj nn = .  
Notations 
],[ jj za  Supply range 
jQ  Cost function defined over ],[ jj za  
jl  Number of piecewise linear segments in jQ  
s
jβ  Slope of jQ  on )~,~( 1 sjsj δδ −  
s
jδ  1~~ −−≡ sjsj δδ  
s
jn  Fixed cost associated with segment s   
s
jn
~  s
j
s
jj nQ +)~(δ  
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~
,...,
~
(( 010 jjj
l
jj
l
jjj
l
jjj nnza ββδδ ==≡  
The function is assumed to be strictly increasing, but not necessarily marginally decreasing 
as shown in the figure. The assumed cost structure is generic enough to include various 
special cases: concave, convex, continuous, and aj = 0. The cost structure enables the suppliers 
to express their volume discount or economies of scales and/or the production and logistics 
constraints. The volume discount strategy, which is buy more and pay less can be expressed 
with marginally decreasing cost functions. The discontinuities with jump costs in the cost 
structure can capture the production and transportation constraints. 
3.3 Winner determination problem 
Let J be the set of N suppliers. The index j denotes a supplier from set J. As each supplier can 
only submit one bid, we use the index j to denote both the supplier and his bid. The winner 
determination problem (WDP) faced by the buyer is to minimize the total cost of 
procurement with the following decisions: (1) select a set of winning bidders JJ ⊆′ and (2) 
determine the trading quantity jq for each winning bid .Jj ′∈  The above decisions are to be 
made subject to the following constraints: 
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- Supply Constraint: For every winning bid Jj ′∈ , ],[ jjj zaq ∈ , and for losing bids, .0=jq  
- Demand Constraint: The total quantity procured should satisfy the demand of the buyer: 
.Bq
Jj
j ≥∑
′∈
 
The WDP is a nonconvex piecewise linear knapsack problem (Kameshwaran & Narahari, 
2009a), which is NP-hard. It is a minimization version of a nonlinear knapsack problem with 
a demand of B units. Each bid corresponds to an item in the knapsack. Unlike traditional 
knapsack problems, each item j can be included in the knapsack in a pre-specified range 
],[ jj za  and the cost jQ is a function of quantity included.  
The cost function jQ of Figure 3 is nonlinear but due to the piecewise linear nature, the 
WDP can be modelled as the following MILP. 
 ( )∑ ∑
∈ = ⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
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⎛ ++
Jj
l
s
s
j
s
j
s
j
s
j
s
jjj
j
xdndn
1
00min    δβ  (1) 
subject to 
 01 jj dd ≤   Jj∈∀  (2) 
 sj
s
j dx ≤   jlsJj ≤≤∈∀ 1 ;  (3) 
 1+≥ sjsj dx   jlsJj <≤∈∀ 1 ;  (4) 
 Bxda
Jj
l
s
s
j
s
jjj
j ≥⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +∑ ∑
∈ =1
0 δ  (5) 
 { }1,0∈sjd    jlsJj ≤≤∈∀ 0 ;  (6) 
 [ ]1,0∈sjx    jlsJj ≤≤∈∀ 1 ;  (7) 
The decision variable sjx  denotes the fraction of goods chosen from the linear segment s  of 
bid .j For this setup to make sense, whenever 0>sjx then ,01 =−sjx for all .s  To enable this, 
binary decision variable sjd  is used for each segment to denote the selection or rejection of 
segment s  of bid .j  The winning quantity for bid j  is ∑ =+ jls sjsjjj xda 10 δ  with cost ( )∑ = ++ jls sjsjsjsjsjjj xdndn 100 δβ . The binary decision variable 0jd  is also used as an indicator 
variable for selecting or rejecting bid ,j  as 00 =jd  implies that no quantity is selected for 
trading from bid .j  
3.4 Business constraints 
The business rules and purchasing logic can be added as side constraints to the WDP. For 
the above procurement scenario, the relevant business constraints are restricting the number 
of winning suppliers in a given range [LB, UB] and guaranteeing a minimum volume (or 
monetary business worth) MIN_QTY (MIN_VAL) for a set of incumbent suppliers JJ ⊂' .  
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The above constraints can be added as side constraints to the WDP. Usually one of the (9) or 
(10) is used. Business rule that limits the winning quantity or business value for a winning 
supplier can be implicitly included by suitably modifying the supply range ],[ jj za .  
3.5 Algorithms 
Dynamic programmic based exact and approximation algorithms were proposed in 
(Kameshwaran & Narahari, 2009a) and a Benders’ decomposition based exact algorithm was 
proposed in (Kameshwaran & Narahari, 2009b) to solve the WDP formulated as (1)-(7). 
Similar procurement scenarios have been considered in the literature with various 
assumptions. Kothari et al. (2003) expressed the cost function using fixed unit prices over 
intervals of quantities (piecewise linear but continuous with no jump costs) and 
approximation algorithms based on dynamic programming were developed for solving the 
WDP. Procurement with nonconvex piecewise linear cost functions was considered by 
Kameshwaran & Narahari (2005) with the additional business constraint of restricting the 
number of winning suppliers. A Lagrangian based heuristic was proposed to solve the 
WDP. Eso et al. (2005) considered the quantity discount procurement of heterogeneous 
goods and column-generation based heuristic was proposed to solve the WDP.  
3.6 Other discount based sourcing techniques 
In the above, we briefly discussed about volume discounts offered while procuring multiple 
units of a single item. Eso et al. (2005) considered buying multiple items with volume 
discounts for each item. There are two kinds of discounts for procuring multiple units of 
multiple items: Business volume discounts (Sadrain & Yoon ,1994) and total quantity discounts 
(Goossens et al. 2007). In the business volume discounts, the discounts are based on the total 
monetary worth of the purchase rather than on the quantity. This discount structure is 
applicable in telecommunication sourcing. In total quantity discounts, discount is based on 
the total quantity of all items purchased. This discount is used in chemical and also in 
telecom capacity sourcing. Exact algorithms based on brand and bound were proposed in 
(Goossens et al., 2007) to solve this problem. For a special case with single unit demand for 
multiple items, a suite of branch-and-cut algorithms was proposed in (Kameshwaran et al., 
2007).  
4. Combinatorial sourcing 
Consider a sourcing scenario where the buyer wants to buy a set of heterogeneous items. 
Two immediate approaches to procure them are in sequence (sequential procurement with 
one after another) and in parallel (all items are procured simultaneously by conducting a 
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sourcing auction for each item separately). The third option is to conduct a combinatorial 
auction where the supplier can bid on a combination of items by providing a single bid price 
(Cramton, 2006).  Thus the bid price is conditional on winning the entire combination of 
items. These auctions are ideal for scenarios in which synergies exist between the items. 
Suppose a supplier obtains more profit by selling a set of items together, then he can submit 
this all-or-nothing combinatorial bid by providing a discounted price on that entire package. 
The supplier can submit more than one bid and the items in different bids can be 
overlapping.  
Combinatorial auctions were initially used in selling scenarios like airport slot allocation 
(Rassenti et al., 1982) and radio spectrum auctions (Rothkopf et al., 1998). The sourcing 
applications mainly include procurement of transportation services (Caplice & Sheffi, 2006), 
in addition to direct sourcing of industrial inputs (Hohner et al., 2003). In this following, we 
present various combinatorial bids and the respective WDP formulations. 
4.1 Static package bids 
Let the items to be procured be indexed by i, each with demand di. A bidder j bids on a 
package or bundle of items, providing a single bid price for that bundle. Let the package be 
indexed by k. As mentioned above, the bidder can submit different packages as bids with 
possibly overlapping items. The winner determination problem can be formulated as the 
following 0-1 integer program. 
     min k kj j
j k
C y∑∑  (11) 
subject to 
 
:
k k
ij j i
j k i k
y dδ
∈
=∑∑   i∀  (12) 
 { }0,1kjy ∈    kj,∀  (13) 
where the notations are: 
Indices 
i Item identification 
j Supplier identification 
k Package identification 
Decision variables 
k
jy  = 1 if supplier j is assigned package k = 0, otherwise 
Data 
k
jC  Bid price for package k of supplier j 
k
ijδ  Volume of item i as a part of package k for supplier j 
The objective function (11) minimizes the total procurement cost. The constraint (12) 
enforces the demand requirements of the buyer. The above formulation allows for each 
supplier to win more than one package bids. This is OR bidding language (implying logical 
OR). Another popular bidding language used in practice is XOR, which allows at most one 
www.intechopen.com
 Supply Chain, The Way to Flat Organisation 
 
84 
winning package bid for each supplier. For a more detailed discussion about the bidding 
languages, see Nisan (2000). The XOR constraint can be easily included as follows: 
 1kj
k
y ≤∑    j∀  (14) 
The above formulation is more appropriate for unit demand di=1 for each item i (hence 
1kjiδ = ). For multi-unit demands, flexible package bids are beneficial, as the buyer can 
choose the winning quantity for each supplier. 
4.2 Flexible package bids 
With flexible package bids, supplier j can provide supply range [ , ]k kji jiLB UB for item i as a 
part of package k. The formulation for the WDP is as follows: 
      min k kij ij
j k i
C x∑∑∑  (15) 
subject to 
 
:
k
ij i
j k i k
x d
∈
=∑∑    i∀  (16) 
 k k k k kji j ij ji jLB y x UB y≤ ≤    jki ,,∀  (17) 
 { }0,1kjy ∈    kj,∀  (18) 
 0kjix ≥    jki ,,∀  (19) 
where the additional decision variable and data are: 
k
ijx  
Decision variable that denotes the winning quantity for item i from package k of 
supplier j 
k
ijC  Unit bid price for item i from package k of supplier j 
4.3 Business constraints 
Several business rules are used in combinatorial sourcing. We will need additional decision 
variables and data to add the business rules as side constraints to the WDP. 
Additional decision variables 
i
jw  = 1 if supplier j supplies item i, = 0 otherwise  
jz  = 1 if supplier j is a winning supplier, = 0 otherwise 
Additional data 
iL  Item limit of suppliers who can supply item i  
]'','[ SS  Range of number of overall winning suppliers 
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[Min_Vol, Max_Vol] Minimum and maximum volume guarantee 
[Min_Val, Max_Val] Minimum and maximum business guarantee 
M A large constant 
jF  Fixed cost of developing supplier j 
i
jF  Fixed cost of developing supplier j for item i 
To limit the number of suppliers at the item level and at the whole sourcing level, following 
side constraints can be added: 
 k iij jx M w≤    jki ,,∀  (20) 
 kj jy M z≤    jk ,∀  (21) 
 ij i
j
w L≤∑    i∀  (22) 
 ' ''j
j
S z S≤ ≤∑  (23) 
 { }0,1ijw ∈    ij,∀  (24) 
 { }0,1jz ∈    j∀  (25) 
Minimum and maximum volume (business) guarantees can be enforced with the following 
constraints: 
 _  _  kj ij j
k i
Min Vol z x Max Vol z≤ ≤∑∑    j∀  (26) 
 _  _  k kj ij ij j
k i
Min Val z C x Max Val z≤ ≤∑∑    j∀  (27) 
Including new suppliers into the sourcing network may incur extra fixed costs. This cost is 
associated with developing and maintaining a long-term relationship with a new supplier. 
This is due to the joint technology transfer, engineering, and quality programs with the 
supplier to enable him to meet the buyer’s business and product and requirements. 
Sometimes the fixed cost could at product level. The fixed cost business constraints, 
however, need to be added at the objective function. 
     min k k iij ij ij j j j
j k j i j
C x F w F z+ +∑∑ ∑∑ ∑  (28) 
4.4 Algorithms 
Winner determination problems for combinatorial bids are well studied among the current 
bid structures. As noted in (Sandholm et al., 2005), three different approaches have been 
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pursued in literature: (1) algorithms that find a provable optimal solution but the 
computational time dependent on problem instances (Sandholm, 2006), (2) algorithms that 
are fast with guaranteed computational time but can only find a feasible, not necessarily an 
optimal solution (Lehmann et al., 2002), and (3) restricting the bundles on which bids can be 
submitted so that the problem can be solved optimally and provably fast (Rothkopf  et al., 
1998; Muller, 2006). Combinatorial sourcing are supported and conducted by many 
commercial providers like CombineNet, Manhattan Associates, JDA, NetExchange, and 
Trade Extensions. 
5. Multi-attribute and multi-criteria sourcing 
In industrial procurement, several aspects of the supplier performance, such as quality, lead 
time, delivery probability, etc have to be addressed, in addition to the qualitative attributes 
of the procured item. A multi-attribute bid has several dimensions and this also allows the 
suppliers to differentiate themselves, instead of competing only on cost. Multi-attribute 
auctions deal with trading of items which are defined by multiple attributes. They are 
considered to play significant role in the commerce conducted over the WWW (Teich et al., 
1999; Bichler, 2001). A multi-attribute auction as a model for procurement within the supply 
chain was studied in (Che, 1993). It is a one-shot auction in which the suppliers respond to 
the scoring function provided by the buyer. Multi-attribute auction for procurement 
proposed in (Branco, 1997) has two stages: A supplier is chosen in the first stage and the 
buyer bargains with the chosen supplier in the second stage to adjust the level of quality. 
The other approach in designing multi-attribute auctions is combining multi-criteria 
decision analysis and single-sided auction mechanisms.  
5.1 Scoring function 
Evaluating the bids by taking into account different factors is a multi-criteria decision 
making (MCDM) problem. MCDM has two parts: multi-attribute decision analysis and multiple 
criteria optimization. Multi-attribute decision analysis techniques are often applicable to 
problems with a small number of alternatives that are to be ordered according to different 
attributes. Two commonly used multi-attribute decision techniques (Belton 1986) are multi-
attribute utility/value theory (MAUT) (Keeney & Raiffa, 1976) and the analytic hierarchy process 
(AHP) (Saaty, 1980). They use different techniques to elicit the scores or weights, which 
denote the relative importance among the attributes. MAUT allows one to directly state the 
scores or estimate as a utility function identified through risk lotteries. AHP uses paired 
comparisons of hierarchical attributes to derive weights as ratio-scale measures. An 
insightful comparison of both techniques is presented in (Belton 1986). For a comprehensive 
study of different multi-attribute decision analysis techniques the reader is referred to 
(Olson 1996). 
Multi-attribute decision analysis has been used in traditional supplier/vendor selection 
problems (Ghodsypour & O’Brien, 1998; Benyoucef et al., 2003). Multi-attribute auction 
based on MAUT for e-procurement was proposed in (Bichler et al., 1999). The bids 
submitted by the suppliers are in the form of (attribute, value) pairs. Each attribute has a set 
of possible values. Thus a bid is an ordered tuple of attribute values.  
Indices 
i Attribute identification 
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Ki Set of possible values for attribute i 
j Supplier identification 
Multi-attribute bid from j 
Vj (v1j, …, vij, …) where iij Kv ∈  
The buyer assigns weights to the attributes indicating their relative importance and has a 
scoring function for each attribute. The scoring functions essentially convert each attribute 
value to a virtual currency, so that all attribute values can be combined into a single 
numerical value that quantifies the bid. The combination rule generally used is the weighted 
additive combination. 
Scores and weights 
Si Scores for values of attribute i: R∈)( iji vS  
wi Weight for attribute i 
Additive scoring function for bid Vj 
∑
i
ijii vSw )(  
The above weighted scoring function implicitly assumes preferential independence of all 
attributes (Olson 1996). In other words, the preference for any value of an attribute is 
independent of any value of any other attribute. However, in many real world applications, 
interactions exist between attribute values. Such preferential dependencies require non-
linear scoring functions, which are seldom used in practice. For a more comprehensive 
study on the design of multi-attribute auctions see (Bichler, 2001). IBM Research’s ABSolute 
decision engine (Lee et al., 2001) provides buyers, in addition to standard scoring 
mechanisms, an interactive visual analysis capability that enables buyers to view, explore, 
search, compare, and classify submitted bids.  
An iterative auction mechanism to support multi-attribute procurement was proposed in 
(Beil & Wein, 2003). The buyer uses an additive scoring function for non-price attributes and 
announces a scoring rule at the beginning of each round. Through inverse optimization 
techniques, the buyer learns his optimal scoring rule from the bids of the suppliers. The 
mechanism is designed to procure a single indivisible item. An English auction protocol for 
multi-attribute items was proposed in (David et al., 2002), which again uses weighted 
additive scoring function to rank the bids. All the above mechanisms solve the 
incomparability between the bids, due to multiple attributes, by assigning a single 
numerical value to each bid and then ranking the bids by these values. Multi-criteria auction 
proposed in (Smet, 2003) is an iterative auction which allows incomparability between bids 
and the sellers increment their bid value by bidding more in at least one attribute. Iterative 
multi-attribute auctions for procurement were proposed in (Parkes & Kalagnanam, 2005) for 
procuring a single item. The bid consists of a price for each attribute and the iterative format 
provides feedback to the suppliers to update their bid prices. 
5.2 Multi-criteria optimization for bid evaluation 
In multiple criteria decision making situations with large or infinite number of decision 
alternatives, where the practical possibility of obtaining a reliable representation of decision 
maker’s utility function is very limited, multiple criteria optimization techniques are useful 
approaches. Multiple attributes can be used both in bid definition and bid evaluation 
(winner determination). In the following, we describe the use of multiple criteria in bid 
evaluation using goal programming (adapted from Kameshwaran et al. (2007)). In (Beil & 
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Weun, 2003), the attributes are distinguished as endogenous (bidder controllable) and 
exogenous from the bidders’ perspective. Attributes in bid definition (or RFQ) provide a 
means to specify a complex product or service, whereas in bid evaluation, the buyer can use 
multiple attributes to select the winning bidders. Therefore in bid definition, all attributes 
should be endogenous for the bidders, whereas in bid evaluation, the buyer can use some 
exogenous attributes to select the winners. In the MCDM literature, the words criteria and 
attribute are used interchangeably, and are defined as descriptors of objective reality which 
represent values of the decision makers (Zeleny, 1982).  
We associate the word attribute with the RFQ and bids i.e. the buyer declares in the RFQ 
various attributes of the goods. We use the word criteria to indicate the objectives defined 
by the buyer for evaluating the bids. For example, if the attributes defined in the RFQ are 
cost, delivery lead time, and delivery probability, and then the criteria used by the buyer for 
evaluating the bids can be total cost, delivery lead time, and supplier credibility. With the 
above norm established, a criterion for evaluating the bids may consist of zero, one, or many 
attributes defined in the RFQ. For example, the criterion that the winning supplier should 
have high credibility, is not an attribute defined in the RFQ but private information known 
to the buyer. On the other hand, minimizing cost of procurement is a function of many 
attributes defined in the RFQ. Thus criterion is used here in the sense of an objective. 
Multiple criteria optimization problems can be solved using various techniques like goal 
programming, vector maximization, and compromise programming (Steuer, 1986; Romero, 
1991). We describe here the use of (goal programming) GP to solve the bid evaluation 
problem. Unlike many multiple criteria optimization techniques which require special 
software tools, GP can be handled by commercial linear and nonlinear optimization 
software packages with minimal modifications. In GP, the criteria are given as goals and the 
technique attempts to simultaneously achieve all the goals as closely as possible. For 
example, the cost minimization criterion can be converted to the goal: Cost ≤ $20, 000, where 
$20, 000 is the target or aspiration level. When the target levels are set for all criteria, GP 
finds a solution that simultaneously satisfies all the goals as closely as possible: It is more of 
a satisficing technique than an optimizing technique. The goal g can be any of the following 
types:  
- greater than or equal to (≥ tg) 
- less than or equal to (≤ tg)  
- equality (=tg) 
- range ( ],[ ''' gg tt∈ )  
The tg’s are the target or aspiration levels. Without loss of generality let us assume the 
following goal structure for the procurement problem: 
 
}{ goal  1f=Xc1  )( 11 tf ≥   
}{ goal  22 f=Xc  )( 22 tf ≤   
}{ goal  33 f=Xc  )( 33 tf =   
B   (29) 
}{ goal  GG f=Xc  ]),[( ''' GGG ttf ∈   
subject to   
F∈X   (30) 
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The X is the vector of decision variables belonging to the feasible set F . The constraint set 
F∈X can be explicitly defined by linear inequalities. For brevity, we will use the above 
implicit representation. To convert the above GP to a single objective mathematical 
program, a deviational variable is defined for each goal. It essentially measures the 
deviation of the respective goal from its target value. Following goal constraints are added 
to the constraint set (30): 
 
11  t≥+ +γXc1    
222  t≤− −γXc    
3333  t=−+ −+ γγXc    
B   (31) 
'  GGG t≥+ +γXc    
''  GGG t≤− −γXc    
all 0≥γ    
 
The range goal gives rise to two constraints but the other goals lead to only one each. The 
+
gγ measures the deviation away from the goal in the positive direction and −gγ  is for the 
negative direction. The above goal constraints do not restrict the original feasible region F. 
In effect, they augment the feasible region by casting F into a higher dimensional space 
(Steuer, 1986). The GP techniques vary by the way the deviational variables are used to find 
the final solution. We present here the weighted GP technique for solving the bid evaluation 
problem. 
Weighted GP (WGP) or Archimedian GP uses weights, given by the buyer, to penalize the 
undesirable deviational variables. The buyer specifies the weight −+/gκ  for goal g. The 
weights measure the relative importance of satisfying the goals. The GP (29) will then be the 
following single objective programming problem: 
 −+−+∑ //min  g
g
g γκ  (32) 
subject to 
 (31) and F∈X  (33) 
The goals are generally incommensurable (for example, cost minimization is measured in 
currency whereas minimizing lead time is measured in days) and the above objective 
function is meaningless as the weighted summation includes different units. The most 
intuitive and simplest way would be to express g as percentage rather than as absolute value 
(Romero, 1991). For e-sourcing, the buyer can specify maximum deviation allowed for a goal 
and then use the percentage of deviation in the objective function. 
The multi-attribute sourcing techniques described in this section are extremely useful for 
sourcing complex goods and services, but they are not wide spread in practice as one would 
expect. The main hurdle is the lack of exposition of the purchase managers and vendors to 
these techniques. It is only a matter of time till they are convinced of the profitability of 
these techniques at the cost of the high complexity, like in the case of combinatorial and 
volume discount auctions. 
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5.3 Configurable bids 
Configurable bids are used for trading complex configurable products and services like 
computer systems, automobiles, insurances, transportation, and construction (Bichler et al., 
2002). Configurable bids are an extension of multi-attribute bids. A multi-attribute bid is a 
set of attribute-value pairs, where each pair denotes the value specified by the bidder for the 
corresponding attribute. In a configurable bid, the bidder can specify multiple values for an 
attribute. The buyer can configure the bid optimally by choosing an appropriate value for 
each of the attributes. 
Indices 
i Attribute identification 
k Value identification 
j Supplier identification 
Configurable bid from j 
ki
k
ijc ,}{  where 
k
ijc is the cost of value k for attribute i 
Decision variables 
k
ijx  = 1 if value k is chosen for attribute i for supplier j 
The above bid structure implicitly assumes that the total cost is the sum of the individual 
costs incurred for each attribute. This may not be realistic but on the other hand, defining a 
cost function over a space of attribute-value pair is pragmatically impossible for the buyer.  
For example, a bid for 10 attributes with 5 values for each should consider a space of 9.7 
million possible configurations. The additive cost structure generally works fine, except for 
certain constraints. For example, while configuring a computer system, a particular 
operating system may require a minimum amount of memory but not vice versa. Such 
logical constraints are not uncommon. Also, such logical constraints can be used to model 
non-additive cost structures like discounts and extra costs. The logical constraints can be 
converted into linear inequalities (probably with additional binary variables) and hence can 
be added to the winner determination problem. Buyer’s constraints like homogeneity of 
values for a particular attribute in multi-sourcing can also be added as constraints to the 
optimization problem.  
The configurable bids and in general, multi-attribute sourcing is not widely used in practice 
despite the theoretical popularity. Even the laboratory experiments showed encouraging 
results. Multi-attribute auctions with three different settings were experimented in 
laboratories: (1) with buyer’s scoring function fully revealed for two attributes (Bichler, 
2000), (2) with buyer’s scoring function not revealed for three attributes (Strecker, 2003), and 
(3) with partial revelation of the scoring function for three attributes (Chen-Ritzo et al., 
2005). All the three showed that multi-attribute auction formats outperform single attribute 
auctions. Though rarely used in practice currently, one can expect to see its wide spread 
usage in near future. 
6. Global sourcing 
Advent of global markets enhanced the emergence of global firms which have factories in 
different countries. Manufacturers typically set up foreign factories to benefit from tariff and 
trade concessions, low cost direct labor, capital subsidies, and reduced logistics costs in 
foreign markets (Ferdows, 1997). Global sourcing is used as a competitive strategy by firms 
to face the international competition, where suppliers located worldwide are selected to 
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meet the demands of the factories, which are also located internationally (Gutierrez & 
Kouvelis, 1995; Velarde & Laguna, 2004). The main reasons are lower costs, improved 
quality, operational flexibility, and access to new technology. 
Global sourcing is also used synonymously with outsourcing by some authors. In this 
chapter, global sourcing is used to denote international sourcing or international purchasing. In 
particular, we define global sourcing as procuring from a set of suppliers located worldwide 
to meet the demands of a set of factories, which are also located worldwide. Thus, there is 
no single buyer, but a set of buyers (factories belonging to the same company). Consider a 
company with many factories located domestically in a region. The purchasing department 
usually aggregates the demands of all the factories (to gain volume discount) and conducts 
e-sourcing auction for procurement. There is no distinction between the different factories 
from the suppliers’ perspective, as usually they belong to the same region. Consider a 
multinational company with a set of factories located worldwide. The classical way of 
managing a multinational is to operate each firm as a domestic firm in its respective 
country. In the last two decades, global firms started adopting integrated management 
strategies, which blurs the national borders and treat the set of factories from different 
countries as a part of the same supply chain network. Global sourcing is one such integrated 
strategy, where suppliers located worldwide are selected to meet the demands of the 
factories, which are also located internationally. In this section, we present the design of 
global sourcing network, which is the equivalent to the winner determination problem in the 
global sourcing scenario. 
Global sourcing network (GSN) is a set of suppliers in various countries to support the 
demands of the firm’s international factory network. There are two kinds of decisions that 
are made in the design of GSN: 
- Supplier selection: The subset of suppliers to be included in the sourcing network. This is 
a strategic investment decision that is made at the beginning of planning horizon, 
which incurs the one-time supplier development costs to the firm. 
- Order allocation: The allocation of orders from the selected suppliers to the factories to 
meet the demand at the factories. This is a tactical decision, influenced by the 
procurement costs.  
The first decision is implemented before the planning horizon and the second is 
implemented during it. This is a single-period problem as there is only one order allocation. 
The supplier selection decision is assumed fixed and irreversible during the planning 
horizon i.e. no new suppliers can be added once the decision is made. Each supplier has a 
fixed development cost, which is the cost of including the supplier in the network. The 
objective is to minimize the total procurement cost that includes both the supplier 
development costs and the order allocation costs. Hence, both the decisions are contingent 
on each other and are made in tandem. In addition to the suppliers, we consider two other 
sources of supply: Redundant inventory and spot purchase. Redundant inventory is a part of 
strategic decision, which once invested incurs a fixed cost irrespective of whether it is used 
or not. Thus it has a fixed cost and a maximum capacity associated with it. Spot purchase is 
another option that has no strategic component. If all other sources are unavailable, the 
organization can always go for this sure but costlier option. We assume that the capacity is 
infinite. The cost incurred due to lost in sales or unmet demand can also be modelled using 
this option. It essentially has the same characteristics: No fixed cost; no upper limit; sure but 
costlier option. All the above can be summarized as follows. 
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Parameters 
- International factory network: The number of factories and their locations are assumed to 
be known and fixed. Index i is used as the factory identifier. 
- Potential suppliers: The potential global suppliers are assumed to be known and their 
locations are fixed. Suppliers are identified by index j. 
- Demand: The demand for the item to be sourced at factory i is di. 
- Supply: The available supply quantity from supplier j is given as range [aj, zj], which 
denotes the minimum and maximum quantity that can be procured from the supplier. 
- Supplier development costs: The fixed cost of developing supplier j is Fcj if he is accepted 
in the sourcing network. 
- Procurement costs: Unit cost of procurement from supplier j for factory i is cij. 
- Redundant inventory: A possible investment in redundant inventory for each factory i 
with capacity ri and total cost Ici. It is more realistic to assume different levels of 
investments with varying capacity and cost ( ){ }lili Icr , . For the sake of brevity, we assume 
only one level of investment for each factory. The proposed model can be easily 
extended to include various levels. 
- Spot purchase: For each factory i, there is a sure source of supply with unit cost Sci and 
infinite capacity. Penalty incurred due to lost sales of unmet demand can also be 
modelled similarly. We have just restricted to one option of this kind per factory for the 
sake of brevity. 
The design of GSN involves identifying an optimal set of suppliers, order allocation from 
the winning suppliers, investments in the redundant inventories, and the quantity to be spot 
purchased for the factory network, such that the total cost of procurement is minimized. 
Decision variables 
xi = 1 if supplier j is included in the network, = 0 otherwise 
yij Quantity supplied from supplier j to factory i 
ui = 1 if investment is made for redundant inventory at factory i 
wi Spot purchase quantity at factory i 
MILP formulation 
  ∑∑∑∑∑ +++
i
ii
i
ii
i j
ijij
j
jj wScuIcycxFcmin     (34) 
subject to 
 iiii
j
ij durwy ≥++∑    i∀  (35) 
 jj
i
ijjj xzyxa ≤≤∑    j∀  (36) 
 { }1,0∈jx     j∀  (37) 
 0≥ijy     ji,∀  (38) 
 { } 0 ,1,0 ≥∈ ii wu     i∀  (39) 
The above problem is the same as the capacitated version of the well studied facility location 
problem (Drezner & Hamacher, 2002) with the suppliers as the facilities and the factories as 
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the markets with demands. The developing cost of a supplier is the fixed cost associated 
with opening of a new facility. Many of the algorithms for facility location problem can be 
adapted for solving the design of GSN problem. 
7. Robust e-sourcing 
Current supply chains are characterized by leanness and JIT principles for maximum 
efficiency, along with a global reach. This makes the supply chain highly vulnerable to 
exogenous random events that create deviations, disruptions, and disasters.  
- A strike at two GM parts plants in 1998 led to the shutdowns of 26 assembly plants, 
which ultimately resulted in a production loss of over 500,000 vehicles and an $809 
million quarterly loss for the company. 
- An eight-minute fire at a Philips semiconductor plant in 2001 brought its customer 
Ericsson to a virtual standstill. 
- Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005 on the U.S. Gulf Coast forced the rerouting of 
bananas and other fresh produce. 
- In December 2001, UPF-Thompson, the sole supplier of chassis frames for Land Rover’s 
Discovery vehicles became bankrupt and suddenly stooped supplying the product. 
Much writings in the recent past as white papers, thought leadership papers, and case 
studies on supply chain risk management have emphasized that redundancy and flexibility 
are pre-emptive strategies that can mitigate loses under random events. But this is against 
the leanness principles and increases the cost. It is required to trade-off between the leanness 
under normal environment and robustness under uncertain environments. It is in this 
context; this section briefly introduces robustness, a characteristic of winner determination 
that is almost neglected in current e-sourcing. Caplice & Sheffi (2006), who were directly 
involved in managing more than hundred sourcing auctions for procuring transportation 
services, emphasize on the significance of robustness in bid evaluation. The supplier 
bankruptcy, transportation link failure, change in demand are common sources of 
uncertainties that are need to be taken into account during bid evaluation.  
7.1 Deviations and disruptions 
The uncertainties in supply chains might manifest in the form of deviations, disruptions, or 
disasters (Gaonkar & Viswanadham, 2004). The deviations refer to the change in the certain 
parameters of the sourcing network like the demand, supply, procurement cost, and 
transportation cost. The deviations may occur due to macroeconomic factors and the default 
sourcing strategies may become inefficient and expensive under deviations. Disruptions 
change the structure of the supply network due to the non-availability of certain production, 
warehousing and distribution facilities or transportation options due to unexpected events 
caused by human or natural factors. For example, Taiwan earthquake resulted in disruption 
of IC chip production and the foot-and-mouth disease in England disrupted the meat 
supply. Under such structural changes, the normal functioning of supply chain will be 
momentarily disrupted and can result in huge losses. The third kind of risk is a disaster, 
which is a temporary irrecoverable shut-down of the supply chain network due to 
unforeseen catastrophic system-wide disruptions. The entire US economy was temporarily 
shutdown due to the downturn in consumer spending, closure of international borders and 
shut-down of production facilities in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. In general, it 
is possible to design supply chains that are robust enough to profitably continue operations 
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in the face of expected deviations and disruptions. However, it is impossible to design a 
supply chain network that is robust enough to react to disasters. This arises from the 
constraints of any system design, which is limited by its operational specification. 
First, we characterize the deviations and disruptions that can happen in a sourcing network. 
The three parameters that influence the sourcing decision are: Demand, supply, and 
procurement cost. The demand is the buyer’s parameter, whereas the supply and the cost are 
given in the bids by the suppliers. In terms of bid evaluation as a mathematical program, the 
objective coefficients are the costs and the demand-supply parameters are the right hand 
side constants of the constraints. The optimal solution to the above mathematical program 
obviously depends on the three parameters. However, all the three are subject to deviations: 
- cost deviation due to macroeconomic change or exchange rate fluctuations 
- supply disruption due to supplier bankruptcy 
- transportation link failure due to natural calamity or port strike, leading to supply 
disruption 
- supply deviation due to upstream supply default 
- demand deviation due to market fluctuation 
The above deviations and disruptions are realized after the bid evaluation but before the 
physical procurement. Thus, these deviations can render the optimal solution provided by 
the bid evaluation costly and inefficient, and even sometimes infeasible and inoperable. To 
handle unforeseen events in sourcing network or in general, supply chain network, there are 
two obvious approaches: (1) to design networks with built in risk-tolerance and (2) to 
contain the damage once the undesirable event has occurred. Both of these approaches 
require a clear understanding of undesirable events that may take place in the network and 
also the associated consequences and impacts from these events. We show here how we can 
design a risk-tolerant sourcing network by taking into account the uncertainties in bid 
evaluation. 
7.2 Bid evaluation under uncertainty 
Bid evaluation problem is an optimization problem and hence we can draw upon the 
optimization techniques that can handle randomness in data. The decision-making 
environments can be divided into three categories (Rosenhead et al., 1972): certainty, risk, 
and uncertainty. In certainty situations, all parameters are deterministic and known, whereas 
risk and uncertainty situations involve randomness. In risk environments, there are random 
parameters whose values are governed by probability distributions that are known to the 
decision maker. In uncertainty environments, there are random parameters but their 
probability distributions are unknown to the decision maker.  
The random parameters can be either continuous or discrete scenarios. Optimization 
problems for risk environments are usually handled using stochastic optimization and that 
for uncertain environments are solved using robust optimization. The goal of both the 
stochastic optimization and robust optimization is to find a solution that has acceptable level 
of performance under any possible realization of the random parameters. The acceptable 
level is dependent on the application and the performance measure, which is part of the 
modelling process. 
Stochastic optimization problems (Birge & Louveaux, 1997; Kall & Wallace, 1994) generally 
optimize the expectation of the objective function like minimizing cost or maximizing profit. 
As probability distributions are known and expectation is used as the performance measure, 
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the solution provided is ex-ante and the decision maker is risk neutral. Robust optimization 
(Kouvelis & Yu, 1994) is used for environments in which the probability information about 
the random events is unknown. The performance measure is hence not expectation and 
various robustness measures have been proposed. The two commonly used measures are 
minimax cost and minimax regret. The minimax cost solution is the solution that minimizes 
the maximum cost across all scenarios, where a scenario is a particular realization of the 
random parameters. The minimax regret solution minimizes the maximum regret across all 
scenarios. The regret of a solution is the difference (absolute or percentage) between the cost 
of that solution in a given scenario and the cost of the optimal solution for that scenario. 
Both the approaches have been used to solve the sourcing problem with randomness. 
A robust optimization based approach for uncapacitated version of the sourcing problem 
with exchange rate uncertainty (cost deviation) was considered in (Gutierrez & Kouvelis, 
1995; Kouvelis & Yu, 1997). The uncertainties were modelled using discrete scenarios and 
minimax regret criterion was used to determine the robust solution. In (Velarde & Laguna, 
2004), the deviations in both demand and exchange rates were considered. The randomness 
was modelled using discrete scenarios with probabilities. The objective function had two 
components: expected cost and variability (that measures the risk). In the following we 
outline a robust optimization based approach to solve the bid evaluation problem. 
7.3 Robustness approach to bid evaluation 
The objective here is to propose a robust optimization methodology to design a sourcing 
network that is risk-tolerant. The choice of robust optimization is due to the fact that 
managers are more concerned about the outcome of a random event than its probability of 
occurrence (March & Shapira, 1987). Hence, the optimization of expected cost approach, 
which implicitly assumes the decision maker to be risk neutral, is not directly applicable. It 
was also noted by Gutierrez & Kouvelis (1995) that decisions of the managers are not 
evaluated by their long term expected outcome but by their annual or half-yearly 
performance. Hence, robust optimization that directly works with the outcome of the 
random events, rather than probability and long-run expected outcomes, is more 
appropriate for e-sourcing. 
In the proposed methodology, the randomness is modelled via discrete scenarios. The 
advantage with discrete scenarios is that one need not concern about the source of the 
scenario, but rather work with the scenario directly. For example, a supplier might get 
disrupted due to several reasons: Bankruptcy, transportation link failure, upstream supply 
failure, etc. The buyer needs to only concern about the scenario of a particular supplier 
failing rather than the sources that would cause it. Working at the level of scenarios is 
complicated for probability models, as one has to derive the probability of a scenario from 
the probabilities of the random events that are responsible for that scenario. With no 
probability information required for robust information, discrete scenario modelling is more 
appropriate for sourcing. In the following, we abstract the bid evaluation problem to be an 
optimization problem without specifying the bid structure and the business constraints. 
Indices 
s Scenario identifier 
Data 
sD  Demand vector in scenario s 
sA  Supply vector in scenario s 
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sC  Cost vector in scenario s 
Notation 
X  A solution vector to the bid evaluation problem 
sX  Optimal solution vector to bid evaluation in scenario s 
RX  Robust solution vector 
)(⋅sZ  Cost of solution )(⋅   
A scenario s is characterized by a 3-tuple of vectors: },,{ sss CAD . Thus, any change in 
demand or supply or cost or their combinations represents a scenario. By definition, any two 
scenarios will differ in at least one of the D, A, C vectors. Let s=0 denote the default or 
unperturbed scenario. The lowest cost sL for scenario s is its optimal cost: 
  )(XZ ss=sL  (40) 
From the optimality of sX , it follows that for any solution X, )(XZL ss ≤ . The relative regret 
of solution X for scenario s is: 
 
s
s
s
L
L
Xr
- (X)Z
)(
s
=  (41) 
Let sU denote the maximum cost that will be incurred for scenario s. If ss LU − is negligible, 
then the scenario is not sensitive to the solution. On the other hand if ss LU >> , the scenario s 
has to be judiciously handled, even if it is a low probable event, as it might end up with 
huge increase in the cost. The objective function is robust optimization is a robustness 
measure. The two commonly used measures are minimax cost and minimax regret. The 
minimax cost solution is the solution that minimizes the maximum cost across all scenarios, 
where a scenario is a particular realization of the random parameters. The minimax regret 
solution minimizes the maximum regret across all scenarios. The minimax regret objective is 
given by:  
 )(maxmin Xr s
sX
 (42) 
In general, the minimax versions are overly conservative as the emphasis is on the worst 
possible scenario, which may occur very rarely in practice. Hence, a solution that is good 
with respect to the worst-case scenario may perform poorly on the other commonly 
realizable scenarios. Another measure of robustness is to constrain the regret within pre-
specified value sss pXrp ≤)(: (Snyder & Daskin, 2006). Small values of ps make the solution 
X to perform close to that of the optimal solution Xs for scenario s. Thus, by judiciously 
selecting ps, the buyer can characterize the importance of scenario s. To implement the 
above, the following constraints are included in the formulation for robust design. 
 sss LpXZ )1()( +≤     s∀  (43) 
Note that Ls is the optimal cost for scenario s, and hence for robust design, one needs to 
solve the bid evaluation problem for each of the scenarios. For any solution X, 
sss UXZL ≤≤ )( . Combining with constraint (43), one can derive the maximum value for sp : 
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 1−≤
s
s
s
L
U
p     s∀  (44) 
The }{ sp are the input parameters to be provided by the buyer to define the acceptable levels 
of operation for different scenarios. Determining sU  will aide the buyer in choosing an 
appropriate value for sp . Let RX  be a robust solution that satisfies the constraints (xx). 
Then, 
 sRs pXr ≤)(     s∀  (45) 
Given a set of robust solutions }{ RX , the buyer can choose the best one based on different 
business criteria. The robust solution ensures that the sourcing network operates at the 
predetermined operating levels under a wide range of pre-identified scenarios. Thus, the 
usefulness of the approach clearly depends on the number and the nature of the 
representative scenarios identified. However, constraint set (43) requires that the winner 
determination problem needs to be solved for every scenario. As noted in the previous 
sections, winner determination problems are computationally challenging for complex bid 
structures and in the presence of business constraints. Thus, the need for solving it for each 
of the scenarios limits the number of scenarios that can be considered in the robust design.  
8. Final notes 
This chapter was devoted to optimization based e-sourcing models. It reviewed three 
popular e-sourcing techniques with their underlying mathematical programming models 
that are used to solve the winner determination problems. The volume discount and 
combinatorial sourcing are actively used in business-to-business commerce saving billions 
of dollars annually. The multi-attribute sourcing technique is yet to catch up, but one can 
expect increased use in near future given its popularity in literature and encouraging results 
in laboratory experiments. 
All the three techniques reviewed in the chapter are provided commercially as e-sourcing 
tools by many vendors. We also presented in this chapter two future directions, which are 
inevitable in the evolution of e-sourcing techniques and tools. One is global sourcing, which 
connects multiple suppliers with multiple factories, all located internationally. The second is 
the robust sourcing that takes into account deviations and disruptions, which can render the 
solution provide by traditional e-sourcing tools inefficient and costly. We presented both the 
above in the framework of optimization based e-sourcing and hence the currently available 
methodologies and tools can be adapted to include them.  
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